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Abstract
Strategic interactions ranging from politics and pharmaceuticals to e-commerce and social networks support
equilibria in which agents with private information manipulate others which are vulnerable to deception. Especially
in cyberspace and the Internet of things, deception is difficult to detect and trust is complicated to establish. For this
reason, effective policy-making, profitable entrepreneurship, and optimal technological design demand quantitative
models of deception. In this paper, we use game theory to model specifically one-to-many deception. We combine
a signaling game with a model called a Poisson game. The resulting Poisson signaling game extends traditional
signaling games to include 1) exogenous evidence of deception, 2) an unknown number of receivers, and 3) receivers
of multiple types. We find closed-form equilibrium solutions for a subset of Poisson signaling games, and characterize
the rates of deception that they support. We show that receivers with higher abilities to detect deception can use
crowd-defense tactics to mitigate deception for receivers with lower abilities to detect deception. Finally, we discuss
how Poisson signaling games could be used to defend against the process by which the Mirai botnet recruits IoT
devices in preparation for a distributed denial-of-service attack.
Index Terms
Deception, trust, crowd defense, signaling games, Poisson games, Internet of things, denial-of-service
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent book by nobel prize winners George Akerlof and Robert Shiller is entitled Phishing for Phools: The
Economics of Manipulation and Deception [3]. Akerlof and Shiller argue that markets admit equilibria in which
deceivers exploit those who are vulnerable. This exploitation is a kind of phishing akin to email phishing. But the
authors “create a new, broader meaning for the word phish here. [They] take the computer definition as a metaphor”
for “getting people to do things that are in the interest of the phisherman, but not in the interest of the target.”
Similarly, by their definition, “a phool is someone who, for whatever reason, is successfully phished.” Advertising,
politics, pharmaceuticals, and finance all offer markets in which phisherman can profit by deceiving phools.
A. Deception in the Internet of Things
Opportunities for deception also abound in cyberspace, where cues to deception found in interpersonal relation-
ships are missing, and where it is difficult to impute responsibility [13]. This is especially true in the emerging
the Internet of things (IoT), a “dynamic global network infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities based on
standard and interoperable communication protocols where physical and virtual ‘things’ have identities, physical
attributes, and virtual personalities” [1]. Poor security and authentication methods exasperate deception in the IoT.
An HP report found security vulnerabilities in ten out of ten smartwatches, including insufficient authentication [2].
Social engineering can also be used to obtain passwords or issue malware for IoT devices. Once compromised,
these “things” can themselves become vectors of attack. The most notable example—and the one we illustrate
in Section VI—is the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack carried out by the Mirai botnet on the domain
name service provider Dyn. The botnet consisted largely of compromised DVR machines and (ironically) security
cameras [20]. These devices unwillingly knocked major websites offline for several hours.
Moreover, the dynamic and self-configuring nature of the IoT makes accountability of IoT devices challenging.
Each entity in the IoT must decide whether to trust incoming communications from other devices, which may act
selfishly or actually attack other devices. Establishing trustworthiness is difficult, because IoT devices lack repeated
interactions in which to build up trust or punish deceivers [21]. In summary, insecure development practices, large
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Figure 1. Akerlof and Shiller’s Phishing for Phools argues that markets provide incentives for “phishermen” to deceive naive “phools.”
They use deceptive reseach reporting in the pharmaceutical industry as an example. This one-to-many deception involves five features. It is
(1) strategic, and (2) information asymmetric. (The phisherman has private information unknown to his targets.) It is also (3) dynamic: the
phisherman transmits information, and then the targets respond. Finally, the targets have heterogeneous abilities to detect deception (4), and
the number of targets may be unknown (5).
attack surfaces, and network dynamism make it difficult to prevent deception in the IoT. Figure 1 and Figure 2
give examples of phishing for phools in economic markets and in cyberspace, respectively.
B. Motivations to Quantify Deception
Quantifying deception in the IoT is important for two reasons. First, modeling provides the ability to make
predictions. This is important for the development of legal policy, which must evaluate the impacts of legislation,
fines, or incentives. Quantitative predictions are also important for insurance. Moreover, entrepreneurs considering
ventures in the IoT need to make predictions about threats to their investments.
Second, modeling helps engineers design strategic technologies to mitigate deception. Clearly, traditional tech-
nologies such as cryptography, two-factor authentication, and secure software development remain critical com-
ponents of preventing deception. But in light of malware which may completely infiltrate a network and remain
undetected for long periods of time, IoT devices need alternative methods of assessing the trustworthiness of other
devices [5], [32]. These alternative methods include quantifying the likelihood that another device is compromised,
assessing the risk level of incoming messages, and deciding whether to trust commands based on knowledge of
their consequences [25]. Overall, quantitative models of deception are needed in order to make security-relevant
decisions in an optimal manner.
C. Quantitative Models of One-To-Many Deception
What are the common features of deceptive interactions? First, deception is strategic. The phisherman (to continue
the language of Akerloff and Shiller) has an incentive to convince phools to follow a course of action. Incentives
may be financial, personal, or political (c.f. [29], [15], [30]). Typically, the targets of deception also have incentives
not to be phooled. Second, deception is information-asymmetric. The phisherman possesses information which is
unknown to the target. The information could pertain, e.g., to the motives of the phisherman, the value of a product,
or the consequences of a particular action. Third, deception is dynamic. The phisherman first transmits a message,
and then based on the message, his target pursues an action. Fourth, some targets may be able to detect deception.
For example, GPS spoofing may be detected by signal processing techniques [27], and some online opinion spam
may be detected by machine learning [24]. Finally, many types of deception are one-to-many, in the sense that
there is one phisherman and there are many targets1. Moreover, the number of targets for one-to-many deception
may be unknown, and the targets may have heterogeneous abilities to detect deception.
1Other forms of deception are also interesting. For example, spear phishing is a type of one-to-one deception. Additionally, many-to-one
deception includes obfuscation techniques in which a set of users attempt to mislead a centralized entity. AdNauseum, a browser extension
which attempts to frustrate online tracking, is one example in the cyber domain [6]. But we focus on one-to-many deception.
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Figure 2. Vehicles which use navigation applications can experience one-to-many deception in the cyber domain. Consider vehicles at the
top-left of the figure attempting to navigate to the shopping center at the bottom-right. The fastest way is through a residential neighborhood
along Path 1. But residents aiming for privacy can falsely report an accident at Location 3 so that drivers who do not recognize this as
deceptive take Path 2, which is longer.
Game theory provides tools to capture all five of these characteristics. It studies strategic interactions be-
tween agents with possibly-misaligned incentives. Signaling games, in particular, capture interactions which are
information-asymmetric and dynamic [17], [18], [8]. In signaling games, a sender with private information transmits
a message to a receiver, who forms a belief about the information and then chooses an action2. Traditionally,
signaling games do not include the ability to detect deception. But an augmented model for signaling games
with evidence accounts for this possibility [26]. Still, neither traditional signaling games nor signaling games with
evidence account for multiple receivers.
D. Poisson Signaling Games
Our paper addresses this limitation. In our framework, the phisherman broadcasts a message to a pool of an
unknown number of receivers, which have varying abilities to detect deception. We model the pool of receivers
using another class of games called Poisson games [22], [23]. We call the combination of these two classes of
models Poisson signaling games (PSG). By properly defining the private information, messages, and actions, a
subclass of PSG can be used to model one-to-many deception.
PSG for one-to-many deception are conceptualized as a two-layer interaction. A sender resides in the first layer.
The sender may be a legitimate or deceptive type. He chooses whether to transmit to a pool of receivers based
on the strategies that he expects them to follow. In the second layer, the receivers form beliefs about the type of
the sender. Based on these beliefs, they choose whether to trust, ignore, or use active defense against the sender.
Equilibria of the game must satisfy three conditions. First, the sender must choose an optimal strategy given the
strategies of the receivers. Second, the receivers must choose optimal strategies for each of the messages of the
senders and types of evidence for deception. Since the receivers all choose actions at once, their optimality condition
requires a fixed-point equation. In this way, security of all types of receivers is interdependent. Finally, the beliefs
of the receivers must be consistent with the strategies of the senders. Once the equilibria are obtained, they can be
used for prediction and mechanism design.
E. Summary of Contributions
Inspired by the opportunities for phishing for phools in the IoT, we present the following principle contributions.
1) We develop a model of one-to-many deception called PSG. PSG augment signaling games to include a)
exogenous evidence of deception, b) an unknown number of receivers, and c) receivers of multiple types.
2) We find closed-form solutions for the poor status quo equilibria of PSG for one-to-many deception, and obtain
conditions to break out of these equilibria.
2Some examples of the use of signaling games to model deception include [35], [7], [34].
43) We discuss the motivations and malware technology for the Mirai botnet used in the DDoS attack on Dyn.
Then discuss how PSG could be used to develop a mitigation strategy for the stage of recruiting IoT devices
to join the botnet.
F. Related Work
We have already reviewed related models of deception, so in this subsection we focus on works related to modeling
DDoS attacks in particular. First, a previous WEIS paper develops an economic model of the incentives to use
botnets for extortion [30]. It provides a useful foundation for establishing the utility functions of attackers. But the
paper does not actually consider a game-theoretic model. Next, work by Johnson et al. uses a series of two-player,
prior commitment games to model the competition between Bitcoin mining pools [14]. Each pool chooses whether to
invest in mining or in attacking the other pool. This scenario provides an example of economically-motivated denial-
of-service attacks, which also suggests that incentives can be quantified. But it considers competition between mining
pools, whereas we study the recruitment of new bots. Wu et al. use game theory to design defense mechanisms
against DDoS attacks [33]. But the defense mechanisms relate to mitigating the actual attack (the flood of traffic
against a target system), while we focus on botnet recruitment. Finally, Bensoussan et al. use a susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) model to study the growth of a botnet [4]. Ultimately, they develop a differential game in which
an attacker and a defender select optimal levels of effort to grow and contain the botnet, respectively. But our
work focuses on the deceptive element of botnet recruitment. IoT devices in our model maintain beliefs about the
reliability of incoming messages, some of which are issued by malware attempting to recruit devices for a botnet.
In this way, our paper considers the need to trust legitimate messages.
G. Outline of the Paper
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we review signaling games and Poisson games.
Section III combines these games into PSG in order to model one-to-many deception. We define the equilibrium of
PSG in Section IV. Section V obtains closed forms for several equilibria of PSG. These equilibria differ in terms
of the level of deception that they support. In some equilibria, deceptive senders phish for phools with probability
one, while in others they are forced to reduce their participation. Section VI discusses how to transition from the
former set of equilibria to the latter. This section also introduces the history of the Mirai botnet and suggests PSG
to mitigate the process of recruiting new IoT devices into the botnet.
II. REVIEW OF GAME-THEORETIC TOOLS
Our model for one-to-many deception builds upon two games: signaling games with evidence and Poisson games.
A. Signaling Games with Evidence
Signaling games are a class of dynamic, two-player, information-asymmetric games between a sender S and a
receiver R (c.f. [17], [19], [9]). Signaling games with evidence extend the typical definition by giving receivers
some exogenous ability to detect deception. Signaling games with evidence are characterized by the tuple
ΦSG =
(
X,M,E,A, qS , δ, uS , uR
)
. (1)
We now discuss each of the elements of ΦSG. First, S posses some private information unknown to R. This
private information is called a type. Let the finite set X denote the set of possible types, and let x ∈ X denote one
particular type. Harsanyi thought of the realization of a type as a random move by a player “nature” [11]. Each
type occurs with a probability qS(x), where qS : X → [0, 1] such that (s.t.)∑
x∈X
qS (x) = 1 and ∀x ∈ X, qS (x) ≥ 0. (2)
Based on his private information, S communicates a message to the receiver. Let the finite set M denote the
set of possible messages, and let m ∈M denote one particular type. In general, S can use a strategy in which he
chooses various m with different probabilities. We will introduce notation for these mixed strategies later.
5In typical signaling games (e.g. Lewis signaling games [17], [19] and signaling games discussed by Crawford and
Sobel [8]), R only knows about x through m. But this suggests that deception is undetectable. Instead, signaling
games with evidence include a detector3 which emits evidence e ∈ E about the sender’s type [26]. Let δ : E → [0, 1]
s.t. for all x ∈ X and m ∈M, we have∑
e∈E
δ (e |x,m) = 1 and δ (e |x,m) ≥ 0. (3)
Then δ(e |x,m) gives the probability with which the detector emits evidence e given type x and message m. The
evidence is not strategic, but a second random draw by “nature.” Let A be a finite set of actions. Based on m and
e, R chooses some a ∈ A. These can also be chosen using a mixed-strategy.
In general, x, m, and a can impact the utility of S and R. Therefore, let uS : M ×A→ R|X| be a vector-valued
function such that
uS (m, a) =
[
uSx (m, a)
]
x∈X , (4)
which is a column vector with entries uSx (m, a). These entries give the utility that S of each receiver of type
x ∈ X obtains for sending a message m when the receiver plays action a. Next, define the utility function for R by
uR : X ×M ×A→ R, such that uR(x,m, a) gives the utility that R receives when a sender of type x transmits
message m and R plays action a.
B. Poisson Games
Poisson games were introduced by Roger Meyerson in 1998 [22]. This class of games models interactions
between an unknown number of players, each of which belongs to one type in a finite set of types. Modeling the
population uncertainty using a Poisson random variable (r.v.) is convenient because merging or splitting Poisson
random variables still results in Poisson random variables4.
Section III will combine signaling games with Poisson games by considering a sender which issues a command
to a pool of an unknown number of receivers, which all respond at once. Therefore, we will call of the players of
the Poisson game “receivers,” although this is not part of the formulation of the original game. Poisson games can
be characterized by the tuple
ΦPG =
(
λ, Y, qR, A, u˜R
)
. (5)
First, the population parameter λ > 0 gives the mean and variance of the Poisson distribution. Let the finite set
Y denote the possible types of each receiver, and let y ∈ Y denote one of these types. Each receiver has type y
with probability qR(y), where ∑
y∈Y
qR (y) = 1 and ∀y ∈ Y, qR (y) > 0. (6)
Because of the decomposition property of the Poisson random variable, the number of receivers of each type
y ∈ Y also follows a Poisson distribution. Based on her type, each receiver chooses an action a in the finite set A.
We have deliberately used the same notation as the action for the signaling game, because these two actions will
coincide in the combined model.
Utility functions in Poisson games are defined as follows. For a ∈ A, let ca ∈ Z+ (the set of non-negative
integers) denote the count of receivers which play action a. Then let c be a column vector which contains entries
ca for each a ∈ A. Then c falls within the set Z(A), the set of all possible integer counts of the number of players
which take each action.
Poisson games assume that all receivers of the same type receive the same utility. Therefore, let u˜R : A×Z(C)→
R|Y | be a vector-valued function such that
u˜R (a, c) =
[
u˜Ry (a, c)
]
y∈Y . (7)
3This could literally be a hardware or software detector, such as email filters which attempt to tag phishing emails. But it could also be
an an abstract notion meant to signify the innate ability of a person to recognize deception.
4Meyerson also shows that the use of a Poisson r.v. satisfies properties of independent actions and environmental equivalence which would
not be satisfied by the use of any other type of r.v.
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Figure 3. Combined Model for One-to-Many Deception. A sender of type x ∈ X transmits a message m ∈M to a group of an unknown
number of receivers. The number of receivers is drawn from a Poisson random variable with parameter λ. The receivers have multiple types
y ∈ Y. Each type may observe different evidence e ∈ E with different probabilities. Based on m and e, each type of receiver chooses an
action a.
The entries u˜Ry (a, c) give the utility that receivers of each type y ∈ Y obtain for playing an action a while the
vector of the total count of receivers that play each action is given by c. Note that this is different from the utility
function of receivers in the signaling game. Given the strategies of the receivers, c is also distributed according to
a Poisson r.v.
III. COMBINED MODEL FOR ONE-TO-MANY DECEPTION: PSG
Figure 3 depicts Poisson signaling games (PSG). This section first describes PSG in general, and then applies
PSG to study one-to-many deception. It is important to note that PSG could study any type of interaction in which
one sender transmits information to an unknown number of heterogeneous receivers. This class of games is not
limited to studying deception.
A. Combination of ΦSG and ΦPG
PSG can be characterized by combining ΦSG and ΦPG to get the tuple
ΦPGSG =
(
X,Y,M,E,A, λ, q, δ, US , UR
)
. (8)
As with signaling games and Poisson games, X denotes the set of types of S, and Y denotes the set of types of
R. M, E, and A denote the set of messages, evidence, and actions, respectively. The Poisson parameter is λ.
The remaining elements of ΦPGSG are slightly modified from their signaling game or Poisson game counterparts.
First, q : X × Y → [0, 1]2 is a vector-valued function such that
q (x, y) =
[
qS (x) qR (y)
]T (9)
gives the probabilities qS(x), x ∈ X, and qR(y), y ∈ Y, of each type of sender and receiver, respectively. (•T
denotes the transpose of a vector.)
As in the signaling game, δ characterizes the quality of the deception detector. But receivers differ in their ability
to detect deception. Therefore, in PSG, we define the mapping by δ : E → [0, 1]|Y |, s.t. the vector
δ (e |x,m) = [δy (e |x,m)]y∈Y (10)
gives the probabilities δy(e |x,m) with which each receiver type y observes evidence e given sender type x and
message m. This allows each receiver type to observe evidence with different likelihoods5.
Next, the utility functions US and UR are also adjusted for PSG. Let US : M×Z(A)→ R|X| be a vector-valued
function s.t. the vector
US (m, c) =
[
USx (m, c)
]
x∈X (11)
5In fact, although all receivers with the same type y have the same likelihood δy(e |x,m) of observing evidence e given sender type x
and message m, our formulation allows the receivers to observe different actual realizations e of the evidence.
7Table I
RECEIVER TYPES y ∈ Y = {k, o, v}
Do not use active defense Use active defense
Cannot detect deception k –
Can detect deception o v
gives the utility of senders of each type x for sending message m if the count of receivers which choose each
action is given by c. Similarly, let UR : X ×M ×A× Z(A)→ R|Y | be a vector-valued function s.t.
UR (x,m, a, c) =
[
URy (x,m, a, c)
]
y∈Y (12)
gives the utility of receivers of each type y ∈ Y. As earlier, x is the type of the sender, and m is the message. But
note that a denotes the action of this particular receiver, while c denotes the count of overall receivers which choose
each action. In equilibrium, the two will be related, since all receivers will best respond to the whole population
of receivers.
B. Modeling One-to-Many Deception using PSG
Up until this point, we have described a general class of PSG without specifying the nature of the types, messages,
or actions. Now, we use PSG specifically to study one-to-many deception. Consider a scenario in which senders
may be legitimate or deceptive. The senders choose the degree to which they transmit messages to a pool of
receivers. The receivers vary based on two factors: 1) their abilities to detect deception and 2) their preferred
method of responding to deception. Some receivers have no ability to detect deception. These are Akerloff and
Shiller’s phools. Other receivers can detect deception, but—as might be anticipated—they respond to deception by
ignoring it. To better combat deception, we can consider incentivizing a set of advanced receivers to respond to
deception with active defense: e.g., engaging an attacker in order to gather information, reporting offending attackers
to attempt prosecution, or fighting back against the attackers6. If sufficiently few receivers fall for deception, while
sufficiently many combat it by ignoring it or using active defense, then deceptive senders can be incentivized to
decrease the amount in which they participate.
C. Nomenclature for PSG for One-to-Many Deception
Let the set of sender types be given by X = {l, d}, where l represents a legitimate sender, while d represents a
deceptive sender. Let the receiver types be Y = {k, o, v}. Table I describes these types. Type k represents weak
receivers which have no ability to detect deception and do not use active defense. Type o represents strong receivers
which can detect deception, but do not use active defense. Finally, type v represents active receivers which can
both detect deception and use active defense7. We assume that there are no receiver types which would use active
defense even though they can not detect deception.
Next, we move on to messages. In our model, messages do not refer to the contents of a communication.
Rather, they signify whether a type of sender participates in the market or withdraws. Let the set of messages be
M = {p, w}, where p represents participate and w represents withdraw. Withdrawing represents the outside option
for senders. Our goal is decrease the profitability of phishing for phools, such that deceptive senders play w with
high probability.
Let E = {b, n} represent the set of values of evidence emitted by the detector. Evidence b suggests a deceptive
sender, while evidence n suggest a legitimate sender. Finally, let the set of actions be given by A = {t, g, f}.
The action t represents trusting the sender; g represents ignoring the sender, and f represents using active defense
(fighting) the sender.
6Effective methods of prosecuting attackers or trying to actively disrupt deception online and in the IoT still need to be further developed.
But even currently, some methods exist of actively opposing deception. An article by Brian Krebs, for example, describes how one target of
the Mirai botnet was able to convince an upstream Internet service provider to disable Mirai’s command and control server [15]. An article
by Invincea Labs also describes how fight against Mirai by causing a buffer overflow in an IoT device attempting to scan for vulnerable
devices [31]. Our work anticipates further advances in this area which can fall under the heading of “active defense.”
7Of course, the exact divisions between types of receivers could be modified. But the main point is that some receivers are completely
naive and vulnerable to deception. Many others can detect malicious messages but just choose to ignore them. Finally, a third group may
be willing to participate in crowd defense.
8Table II
NOMENCLATURE FOR MIXED STRATEGIES AND EXPECTED UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Variable Meaning
σS = [σSl , σ
S
d ]
T Mixed-strategies σSx (m) of S of type x ∈ X
σR = [σRk , σ
R
o , σ
R
v ]
T Mixed strategies σRy (a |m, e) of R of type y ∈ Y
θ Mixed strategy θ(a |m, e) of some particular R
µR = [µRk , µ
R
o , µ
R
v ]
T Beliefs µRy (x |m, e) of R of type y ∈ Y
U¯S = [U¯Sl , U¯
S
d ]
T Expected utility U¯Sx (σSx , σR) of S of type x ∈ X
U¯R = [U¯Rk , U¯
R
o , U¯
R
v ]
T Expected utility U¯Ry (θ, σR |m, e, µRy ) of R of type y ∈ Y
D. Characteristics of PSG for One-to-Many Deception
The definition of these types, messages, actions, and evidence also implies physical meanings for the utility
functions and detector probabilities. Characteristics 1-6 detail features of PSG for deception based on these physical
meanings.
Characteristic 1. If S withdraws, the game ends and S and R receive some fixed utility. Set this utility to 0. This
is without loss of generality (wlog), since the values of the utility functions can be translated. Formally,
∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , a ∈ A, c ∈ Z (A) , USx (w, c) = URy (x,w, a, c) = 0. (13)
Characteristic 2. If S participates, R of weak and strong types receive utility 0 for ignoring the message of S.
This is also wlog. We have
∀x ∈ X, c ∈ Z (A) , URk (x, p, g, c) = URo (x, p, g, c) = 0. (14)
Characteristic 3. Receivers of all types receive negative utility for trusting a deceptive sender (who participates),
and positive utility for trusting a legitimate sender (who participates). Formally,
∀y ∈ Y, c ∈ Z (A) , URy (d, p, t, c) < 0 < URy (l, p, t, c). (15)
Characteristic 4. Receivers are differentiated based on two factors: 1) their abilities to detect deception, and 2)
their options to respond to deception. Weak receivers have no ability to detect deception. On the other hand, strong
and active receivers have some ability to detect deception. This is
δk (b | d, p) = δk (b | l, p) , δo (b | d, p) > δo (b | l, p) , δv (b | d, p) > δv (b | l, p) . (16)
Characteristic 5. Strong receivers can detect deception, but prefer to ignore it. Active receivers can also detect
deception, but prefer to combat it using active defense. These characteristics are given by
∀x ∈ X, c ∈ Z (A) , URk (x, p, f, c) = URo (x, p, f, c) = −∞, URv (x, p, g, c) = −∞. (17)
Characteristic 6. Active receivers incur negative utility for attempting to use active defense against a legitimate
sender (who participates). They receive positive utility for using active defense against a deceptive sender. We have
∀c ∈ Z (A) , URv (l, p, f, c) < 0 < URv (d, p, t, c). (18)
E. Mixed Strategies and Beliefs
Next, we define the nomenclature for mixed-strategies and expected utility functions. Table II summarizes these
definitions. For the sender, let σSl : M → [0, 1] be a mixed strategy such that σSl (m) gives the probability with
which S of type l plays each message m ∈M. The function σSl belongs to the set
ΣSl =
{
σ¯ |
∑
m∈M
σ¯ (m) = 1, and ∀m ∈M, σ¯ (m) ≥ 0
}
. (19)
Similarly, let σSd (m) ∈ ΣSd give the mixed-strategy probability with which S of type d plays each message m ∈M.
In our model, ΣSd = Σ
S
l .
9For receivers of each type y ∈ Y, let σRy : A → [0, 1] denote a mixed strategy such that σRy (a |m, e) gives the
probability with which she plays action a after observing message m and action e. The functions σRx , x ∈ X,
belong to the sets
ΣRx =
{
σ¯ |
∑
a∈A
σ¯ (a) = 1, and ∀a ∈ A, σ¯ (a) ≥ 0
}
. (20)
Again, we take ΣRk = Σ
R
o = Σ
R
v . Importantly, we also define
σR =
[
σRk σ
R
o σ
R
v
]T
, (21)
the vector of strategies of all the receiver types. Similarly, let ΣR = ΣRk ×ΣRo ×ΣRv denote the space of strategies
of all receiver types.
In order to choose her actions, R forms a belief about the sender type x. Let µRy (x |m, e) denote the likelihood
with which each R of type y who observes message m and evidence e believes that S has type x. In equilibrium,
we will require this belief to be consistent with the strategy of S.
F. Expected Utility Functions
Now we define the expected utilities that S and each R receive for playing mixed strategies. Denote the expected
utility of a sender of type x ∈ X by U¯Sx : ΣSx × ΣR → R. Notice that all receiver strategies must be taken into
account. This expected utility is given by
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) =
∑
m∈M
∑
c∈Z(A)
σSx (m)P
{
c |σR, x,m}USx (m, c). (22)
Here, P{c |σR, x,m} is the probability with which c gives the count of receivers which play each action. This
probability follows a Poisson distribution. It is given by
P
{
c |σR, x,m} = ∏
a∈A
e
−
[
λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR(y)δy(e |x,m)σRy (a |m,e)
][
λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x,m)σRy (a |m, e)
]ca
ca!
. (23)
(Proof: See Appendix A). Next, denote the expected utility of each receiver of type y ∈ Y by U¯Ry : ΣRy ×ΣR → R.
Here, U¯Ry (θ, σ
R |m, e, µRy ) gives the expected utility when this particular receiver plays mixed strategy θ ∈ ΣRy and
the population of all types of receivers plays the mixed-strategy vector σR. The expected utility is given by
U¯Ry (θ, σ
R |m, e, µRy ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
∑
c∈Z(A)
µRy (x |m, e) θ (a |m, e)P
{
c |σR, x,m}URy (x,m, a, c), (24)
where again P{c |σR, x,m} is given by Eq. (23).
IV. EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT FOR PSG
In this section, we describe the equilibrium concept for PSG. First, since PSG are dynamic, we use an equilibrium
concept which involves perfection: the requirement that strategies at each information set of the game be optimal
for the remaining subgame [10]. Second, since PSG involve incomplete information, we use a Bayesian concept.
Third, since each receiver chooses her action without knowing the actions of the other receivers, the Poisson layer
of the game involves a fixed point. All receivers choose strategies which best respond to the optimal strategies of
the other receivers.
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A. Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Definition
Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is the appropriate concept for games with these criteria [9]. Consider the two
layers of PSG. The second layer game takes place among the receivers. This layer is played with a given m, e,
and µR determined by the sender (and detector) in the first layer of the game. When m, e, and µR are fixed, the
interaction between all receivers becomes a standard Poisson game. Define BRRy : Σ
R → 2ΣRy such that the best
response of a receiver of type y to a strategy profile σR of the other receivers is given by the strategy or set of
strategies
BRRy
(
σR |m, e, µRy
)
, arg max
θ∈ΣRy
U¯Ry
(
θ, σR |m, e, µRy
)
. (25)
The first layer takes place between the sender and the set of receivers. If we fix the set of receiver strategies
σR, then the problem of a sender of type x ∈ X is to choose σSx to maximize his expected utility given σR. The
last criteria is that the receiver beliefs µR must be consistent with the sender strategies according to Bayes’ Law.
Definition 1 applies perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium to PSG.
Definition 1. (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) Strategy and belief profile (σS∗, σR∗, µR) is a PBNE of a PSG
if all of the following hold [10]:
∀x ∈ X, σS∗x ∈ arg max
σSx∈ΣSx
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R∗), (26)
∀y ∈ Y, ∀m ∈M, ∀e ∈ E, σR∗y ∈ BRRy
(
σR∗ |m, e, µRy
)
, (27)
∀y ∈ Y, ∀m ∈M, ∀e ∈ E, µRy (d |m, e) ∈

δy(e | d,m)σSd (m)qS(d)∑
x˜∈X
δy(e | x˜,m)σSx˜ (m)qS(x˜) , if
∑
x˜∈X
δy (e | x˜,m)σSx˜ (m) qS (x˜) > 0
[0, 1] otherwise
,
(28)
and µRy (l |m, e) = 1− µRy (d |m, e) .
Equation (26) requires the sender to choose an optimal strategy given the strategies of the receivers. Based on
the message and evidence that each receiver observes, Eq. (27) requires each receiver to respond optimally to the
profile of the strategies of the other receivers. Equation (28) uses Bayes’ law to obtain the posterior beliefs µR
using the prior probabilities qS , the sender strategies σS , and the characteristics δy, y ∈ Y of the detectors [26].
B. Utility Function Structure
Generally speaking, it is challenging to take expected utilities over the distribution of the Poisson r.v. because of
the factorial in Eq. (23). To alleviate this complexity, one option is to use approximations as the number of players
becomes large (λ→∞) [23]. Another approach, however, is to try to exploit the structure of the utility functions.
The utility of each type of sender should be increasing in the number of receivers who play t, and decreasing
in the numbers of receivers who choose g and f. Consider a linear dependence. Define the scalars ωtx, ω
g
x, and ω
f
x
such that, for all x ∈ X, ωfx < ωgx < 0 < ωtf . These scalars represent the magnitude of the utility that S of type
x ∈ X receives for each receiver who plays trust, ignore, and active defense, respectively, when S participates. Let
ωd = [ ωtd ω
g
d ω
f
d
]T and ωl = [ ωtl ω
g
l ω
f
l
]T . Then for each type x ∈ X,
USx (p, c) =
∑
a∈A
ωaxca. (29)
Given the linearity of Eq. (29), we can make use of the decomposition property of the Poisson r.v. to simplify
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R). In fact, we show in Appendix B that the sender’s expected utility depends only on the expected values
of each of the Poisson r.v. that represent the number of receivers who choose each action ca, a ∈ A. The result is
that
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = λσSx (p)
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (a | p, e)ωax. (30)
Next, assume that the utility of each receiver does not depend directly on the actions of the other receivers. The
receivers are still coupled since all of their strategies affect the optimal strategy of S. But there is no exogenous
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coupling. Since the utility is not longer dependent on c, define a modified utility function URy : X ×M ×A→ R
by
URy (x,m, a) ≡ URy (x,m, a, c). (31)
Now U¯Ry (θ, σ
R |m, e, µRy ) is no longer dependent on σR. Hence for each y ∈ Y, we can define U¯Ry (θ |m, e, µRy ) ≡
U¯Ry (θ, σ
R |m, e, µRy ). Note also that R receives zero utility whenever she plays g (Characteristic 2). Equation (24)
is now
U¯Ry
(
θ |m, e, µRy
)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈{t,f}
µRy (x |m, e) θ (a |m, e)URy (x,m, a) . (32)
C. Phishing Equilibrium Definition
Based on the structures of the utility functions, we can update the PBNE requirements from Definition 1. We
still consider a game with one sender and an unknown (Poisson-distributed) number of receivers. Mathematically,
though, it is equivalent to a game between one sender and one receiver who has type y ∈ {k, o, v} with probability
qR(y). We will call this a Phishing Equilibrium.
Definition 2. (Phishing Equilibrium) Strategy profile and belief (σS∗, σR∗, µR) is a Phishing Equilibrium (PE) of
a PSG if all of the following hold
∀x ∈ X, σS∗x ∈ arg max
σSx∈ΣSx
σSx (p)
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (a | p, e)ωax, (33)
∀y ∈ Y, ∀m ∈M, ∀e ∈ E, σR∗y ∈ arg max
θ∈ΣRy
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈{t,f}
µRy (x |m, e) θ (a |m, e)URy (x,m, a) , (34)
∀y ∈ Y, ∀m ∈M, ∀e ∈ E, µRy (x |m, e) ∈

δy(e |x,m)σSx (m)qS(x)∑
x˜∈X
δy(e | x˜,m)σSx˜ (m)qS(x˜) , if
∑
x˜∈X
δy (e | x˜,m)σSx˜ (m) qS (x˜) > 0
[0, 1] otherwise
.
(35)
Equations (33)-(35) are similar to the requirements of a traditional signaling game (c.f. [9]). But they give
receivers varying exogenous abilities to detect deception, and they allow the utility functions of different types of
receivers to differ.
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FOR PSG
In this section, we find several PE of PSG for one-to-many deception. First, if the sender chooses to withdraw,
all subsequent beliefs and actions of the receivers have no impact on the utility of any of the players. Therefore,
we need not enumerate those beliefs and actions as part of a PE.
Second, rather than search for all possible equilibria, we look for those which are reasonable based on what we
observe in deceptive interactions. We identify four pure strategy equilibria which form the status quo. In this status
quo, phishermen participate fully (σSd (p) = 1). This is a poor equilibrium. Therefore, we search for other equilibria
in which the phishermen decrease their participation (σSd (p) < 1).
A. Narrowing the Search for Equilibria
What types of equilibria should we seek? First, we look for equilibria in which legitimate senders participate
fully8: i.e., σS∗l (p) = 1. Next, we look for equilibria in which, ∀e ∈ E, σR∗k (t | p, e) = 1. That is, weak receivers trust
all messages9. Finally, strong and active receivers who observe evidence of e = n can be at least as sure as weak
8Some interactions could be so dominated by deceptive senders that legitimate senders would drop out. But this is not typical of the
interactions we have in mind. For example, it seems absurd that a legitimate bank would stop sending emails to its customers because of
a huge wave of deceptive emails claiming to be from the bank. In the IoT realm, legitimate users of devices would not typically cease
attempting to login to their devices. Therefore, we ignore these cases of “abandoned” markets, and search for equilibria in which σS∗l (p) = 1.
9Since these type of receivers have no ability to detect deception, they decide whether to trust messages only based on the prior probabilities
qS(•). Therefore, weak receivers either trust all messages or ignore all messages. Again, if they were ignore all messages, the market would
be abandoned. Therefore, we assume that qS(d) is sufficiently low that weak users trust all messages.
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Figure 4. Model of a PSG under Lemma 3. First, the types x and y, of S and R, respectively, are drawn. Then S chooses to participate or
withdraw. Based on his type and message, a detector emits evidence that S is legitimate or deceptive. R uses the message and evidence to
choose an action. Lemma 3 determines all of the equilibrium strategies except σS∗d (•) , σR∗o (• | p, b) , and σR∗v (• | p, b) , which are marked
by the purple, dashed information sets.
receivers that the sender is legitimate. Therefore, we look for equilibria in which σR∗o (t | p, n) = σR∗v (t | p, n) = 1.
Lemma 3 gives the parameter regimes under which these equilibrium strategies are found.
Lemma 3. (Parameters of Equilibria under Consideration) Consider the following two equations:
ωtl
(
qR (o) δo (n | l, p) + qR (v) δv (n | l, p) + qR (k)
) ≥ (−ωgl ) qR (o) δo (b | l, p) + (−ωfl ) qR (v) δv (b | l, p) , (36)
qS (d) <
URk (l, p, t)
URk (l, p, t)− URk (d, p, t)
,
URo (l, p, t) δo (n | l, p)
URo (l, p, t) δo (n | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (n | d, p)
,(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (n | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (n | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (n | d, p)
. (37)
If Eq. (36) and Eq. (37) hold, then the strategies in Eq. (38) are self-consistent. Specifically, given σS∗l (p) = 1, the
other strategies are implied. The converse is also true. (Proof: See Appendix C).
σS∗l (p) = 1, σ
R∗
k (t | p, n) = σR∗k (t | p, b) = 1, σR∗o (t | p, n) = 1, σR∗v (t | p, n) = 1. (38)
The remaining equilibrium strategies are σS∗d (•) , σR∗o (• | p, b) , and σR∗v (• | p, b) . Essentially, strong and active
receivers are the only two types which may oppose deceptive senders. Strong receivers oppose them only by
ignoring suspicious messages, while active receivers oppose them only by using active defense against suspicious
messages. If these efforts are strong enough, they will force σS∗d (p) < 1. Figure 4 depicts the simplified interaction.
The purple, dashed information sets correspond to the remaining strategies. The figure depicts only one receiver,
but this is mathematically equivalent to considering a Poisson number of receivers due to Eq. (30) and Eq. (32).
B. Full Deceptive Participation (Status Quo) Equilibria
Deceptive senders prefer that every type of receiver trust every incoming message, regardless of the evidence,
i.e., σR∗o (t | p, b) = σR∗v (t | p, b) = 1. Under these strategies, σS∗d (p) = 1, since deceptive senders would receive
positive utility for every message. Theorem 4 gives the parameters under which this equilibrium holds. Note that
Fig. 5 (explained at the end of the section) depicts the set of equilibria.
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Theorem 4. (Phishermen Unopposed and Participate Fully) Let Eq. (39) hold:
qS (d) ≤ U
R
o (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (b | d, p)
,(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p)
. (39)
Then a PE exists in which Eq. (40-42) hold. (Proof: See Appendix D.)
σS∗d (p) = 1 (40)
µRo (d | p, b) =
δo (b | d, p) qS (d)
δo (b | d, p) qS (d) + δo (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
o (t | p, b) = 1 (41)
µRv (d | p, b) =
δv (b | d, p) qS (d)
δv (b | d, p) qS (d) + δo (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
v (t | p, b) = 1 (42)
Theorem 4 is only relevant if qS(d) is so small that strong and active receivers should ignore evidence warning
of deception and trust all messages. A more likely equilibrium seems to be that strong receivers would ignore
deceptive messages.
Theorem 5. (Phishermen Ignored and Participate Fully) Let Eq. (43-44) hold:
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (b | d, p)
≤ qS (d) ≤(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p)
, (43)
ωtd
(
qR (k) + qR (v) + qR (o) δo (n | d, p)
) ≥ −ωgdqR (o) δo (b | d, p) . (44)
Then a PE exists in which Eq. (45-47) hold. (Proof: See Appendix E.)
σS∗d (p) = 1 (45)
µRo (d | p, b) =
δo (b | d, p) qS (d)
δo (b | d, p) qS (d) + δo (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
o (g | p, b) = 1 (46)
µRv (d | p, b) =
δv (b | d, p) qS (d)
δv (b | d, p) qS (d) + δv (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
v (t | p, b) = 1 (47)
In this equilibrium, the strong receivers ignore rather than trust messages that give evidence for deception, but
it is not enough to deter phishermen from participating fully. This is a likely status quo, because it hardly costs
phishermen anything to cast a wide deceptive net. Sending messages to additional receivers is essentially free. Next,
Theorem 6 gives a situation in which the receivers behave in an opposite manner: R of y = o trust messages, but
R of y = v use active defense.
Theorem 6. (Phishermen Fought and Participate Fully) Let Eq. (48-49) hold.(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p)
≤ qS (d) ≤ U
R
o (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (b | d, p)
, (48)
ωtd
(
qR (k) + qR (o) + qR (v) δv (n | d, p)
) ≥ −ωfd qR (v) δv (b | d, p) . (49)
Then a PE exists in which Eq. (50-52) hold. (Proof: See Appendix F.)
σS∗d (p) = 1 (50)
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Figure 5. Depiction of the equilibria in Theorems 4-9. S of type d will participate completely in any located in the top-half planes of both
figures. R of y = o will ignore messages with evidence for deception for equilibria in the left-half plane of the pair of axis to the right. R
of y = v will use active defense against messages with evidence for deception for equilibria in the left-half plane of the pair of axis to the
left. The equilibria below the horizontal axes are desirable. In these, σS∗d (p) < 1.
µRo (d | p, b) =
δo (b | d, p) qS (d)
δo (b | d, p) qS (d) + δo (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
o (t | p, b) = 1 (51)
µRv (d | p, b) =
δv (b | d, p) qS (d)
δv (b | d, p) qS (d) + δv (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
v (f | p, b) = 1 (52)
In this scenario, active receivers attempt to mitigate deception, but the incentives to deceptive senders for catching
receivers who trust them (the RHS of Eq. (49)) are greater than the penalties to deceptive senders when receivers
use active defense (the LHS of Eq. (49)). The final scenario in which phishermen participate fully is given in
Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. (Phishermen Fought and Ignored and Participate Fully) Let Eq. (53-54) hold.(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p)
,
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (b | d, p)
≤ qS (d) , (53)
ωtd
(
qR (k) + qR (o) δo (n | d, p) + qR (v) δv (n | d, p)
) ≥ −ωfd qR (v) δv (b | d, p)− ωgdqR (o) δo (b | d, p) . (54)
Then a PE exists in which Eq. (55-54) hold. (Proof: See Appendix G.)
σS∗d (p) = 1 (55)
µRo (d | p, b) =
δo (b | d, p) qS (d)
δo (b | d, p) qS (d) + δo (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
o (g | p, b) = 1 (56)
µRv (d | p, b) =
δv (b | d, p) qS (d)
δv (b | d, p) qS (d) + δv (l | d, p) qS (l) σ
R∗
v (f | p, b) = 1 (57)
Theorem 7 characterizes a “hopeless” situation for receivers. All receiver types which are capable of combating
deception do combat deception, but this is not enough to deter the deceptive sender. This may be because the utility
parameters are very favorable for the sender, or because the detection capabilities of the receivers are very poor.
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C. Partial Deceptive Participation (Desirable) Equilibria
The equilibria of Theorems 4-7 allow a deceptive sender to fully participate. Ideally, we should design the
parameters of the interaction such that deceptive senders participate less frequently. This subsection characterizes
these equilibria. Deceptive senders never completely drop out of the market, but their participation can be re-
duced. Theorem 8 gives an equilibrium in which being ignored is sufficiently costly that phishermen reduce their
participation.
Theorem 8. (Phishermen Ignored and Do Not Participate Fully) Let Eq. (43) hold but Eq. (44) not hold. Then
there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which σR∗o (g | p, b) < 1 satisfies
ωtd
(
qR (k) + qR (v) + qR (o)
(
1− δo (b | d, p)σR∗o (g | p, b)
))
= −ωgdqR (o) δo (b | d, p)σR∗o (g | p, b), (58)
µRo (d | p, b) and σS∗d (p) < 1 satisfy
µRo (d | p, b) =
URo (l, p, t)
URo (l, p, t)− URo (d, p, t)
, (59)
σS∗d (p) =
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)
qS (p) (URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (b | d, p))
, (60)
and
µRv (d | p, b) =
δv (b | d, p)σS∗d (p) qS (d)
δv (b | d, p)σS∗d (p) qS (d) + δv (l | d, p) qS (l)
σR∗v (t | p, b) = 1. (61)
(Proof: See Appendix H.)
In the opposite direction, Theorem 9 presents an equilibrium in which strong receivers trust deceptive senders,
but active receivers use active defense, and it is enough to deter deceptive senders from participating fully.
Theorem 9. (Phishermen Fought and Do Not Participate Fully) Let Eq. (48) hold but Eq. (49) not hold. Then
there exists an equilibrium in which σR∗v (f | p, b) < 1 satisfies
ωtd
(
qR (k) + qR (o) + qR (v)
(
1− δv (b | d, p)σR∗v (f | p, b)
))
= −ωfd qR (v) δv (b | d, p)σR∗v (f | p, b), (62)
µRv (d | p, b) and σS∗d (p) < 1 satisfy
µRv (d | p, b) =
URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)
URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f) + URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)
, (63)
σS∗d (p) =
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
qS (d) ((URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p))
, (64)
and
µRo (d | p, b) =
δo (b | d, p)σS∗d (p) qS (d)
δo (b | d, p)σS∗d (p) qS (d) + δo (l | d, p) qS (l)
σR∗o (t | p, b) = 1. (65)
(Proof: See Appendix I.)
Here, the active defense of R of type y = v is enough to deter deceptive senders from fully participating. Again,
the players use mixed-strategies σS∗d (p) < 1 and σ
R∗
v (f | p, b) < 1.
Lastly, we may have an equilibrium in which strong receivers ignore deceptive messages and active receivers
use active defense against deceptive messages. In this case, σS∗d (p) is further decreased. We do not solve for this
situation here.
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D. Summary of Equilibria
Let R++ and R−− denote the spaces of strictly positive and strictly negative real numbers, respectively. The
utility vector ωd falls within the space Ω = R++×R2−−. Denote the set of all possible prior probabilities qR for the
receiver by QR, and denote the set of all possible prior probabilities qS for the sender by QS . Finally, define the
set of all possible detector capabilities δ by ∆ = ∆k ×∆o ×∆v. Now we can categorize the equilibrium regions.
Define the function BPSd : Ω×QR×∆→ R s.t. BPSd (ωd, qR, δ) gives the benefit of fully participating (compared
to withdrawing) for a deceptive sender when the parameters are ωd, qR, δ and given that the receivers play an optimal
σR∗. From Eq. (33),
BPSd (ωd, qR, δ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
qR (y) δy (e | d, p)σR∗y (a | p, e)ωad . (66)
Then define the function T DRo : V ×∆o → R s.t. T DRo (UR0 , δRo ) gives the threshold of deceptive senders qS(d)
above which a receiver of type o will choose to ignore rather than trust a message which gives evidence of being
deceptive, assuming σSd (p) = 1. Similarly, let T DRv (URv , δRv ) give the threshold of deceptive senders above which
a receiver of type v will choose to fight rather than to ignore a message which gives evidence of being deceptive.
We have
T DRo (UR0 , δRo ) =
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)
URo (l, p, t) δo (b | l, p)− URo (d, p, t) δo (b | d, p)
, (67)
T DRv (URv , δRv ) =
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p)
. (68)
These are the same quantities as in Eq. (39) of Theorem 4 and the corresponding equations for Theorems 5-7.
Figure 5 summarizes the equilibria. The vertical axis is BPSd (ωd, qR, δ). S of type d will participate completely
(σS∗d (p) = 1) in any equilibria located above the vertical axis. The horizontal axis in the figure on the left is
T DRo (UR0 , δRo )−qS(d). If this quantity is positive, then there is such a low proportion of deceptive senders (compared
to URo and δRo ) that strong receivers will trust messages for which e = b. If this quantity is positive, then strong
receivers will ignore these messages. The horizontal axis in the figure on the right is T DRv (URv , δRv )− qS(d). If this
quantity is positive, then there is a sufficiently-low proportion of deceptive senders (compared to URv and δRv ) that
active receivers will trust messages for which e = b. If this quantity is positive, then strong receivers will use active
defense against these messages. Since all equilibria are characterized by these three different axis, it is necessary
to locate each equilibrium on both halves of the figure. The equilibria below the horizontal axes are desirable. In
these, σS∗d (p) < 1.
VI. APPLICATION OF PSG TO BOTNET RECRUITMENT
In this section, we describe the background of the Mirai botnet, which was responsible for the DDoS attack on
the domain name service provider Dyn. We use this as an example of how mechanisms design could be applied to
move equilibria of the PSG from those in which deceptive senders participate fully to those in which they decrease
participation.
A. Mirai Botnet Attacks
On Sept 22, 2016, the website Krebs on Security was taken out of commission for about three days after a
massive DDoS attack [15] by the Mirai botnet. Around 1 wk later, the attacker leaked Mirai source code. Within
a month, the source code was used for a much more significant DDos.
October 21, around 100,000 bots—largely belonging to the Internet of things (IoT)—participated in an unprece-
dented attack against Dyn, the DNS for major websites such as Twitter, Reddit, Github, and the New York Times.
Outages at these websites lasted for over two hours [20]. In the aftermath of this attack—and with source code
available, many other botnets imitated the technology used by Mirai [29].
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Figure 6. Attack sequence of Mirai botnet and mitigation mechanism. 1) Attack sponsor hires botnet master to launch attack. 2) Botnet
master uses command and control (CC) server to manage recruitment. 3) Mirai scans for vulnerable routers and IoT devices and begins
infection. 4) Malware propagates to new devices. 5) Botnet of infected devices attempts DDoS on victim service. 6) Using active defense,
devices probed by Mirai identify and report traffic. 7) Mitigation strategies can include (a) shutdown of CC server by upstream ISP, (b)
strengthening of potential targets using knowledge from captured traffic.
B. Technological Background
Figure 6 describes the attack sequence of the Mirai botnet. First, attack sponsors hire a botnet master to carry
out an attack of a certain bandwidth or duration. Attack motivations are diverse, and may include experimentation,
establishing reputation [29], [15], personal vendetta or retribution against law enforcement authorities [15], destruc-
tion of a competitor’s services [14], [15], extortion [30], and possibly even probing by a nation state in preparation
for a large attack [29].
Using a command and control server, a botnet master then begins infecting target devices. Building up up a
botnet before a DDoS attacks requires an extensive period of recruiting vulnerable devices. The botnet master
probes IP addresses looking for IoT devices with weak security settings and infect vulnerable devices. It checks
for factory-default settings and passwords that are easy to guess [15] (e.g. root/admin, admin/admin,
root/123456) [12]. The actual infection process is cascading: it propagates from device to device [15].
When the botnet has grown significantly large, a botnet master uses the command and control server to launch
a DDoS attack on a victim. Interestingly, IP addresses used in one Mirai attack came from 164 different countries
[12]. The attack was truly distributed.
Botnet DDoS recruitment underscores the fact that many IoT devices are poorly secured; there are many phools in
the IoT. The process of recruiting vulnerable devices by probing IP addresses looking for weak security settings can
be considered phishing for phools, in which probing IP addresses for vulnerable devices is one type of one-to-many
deception.
C. Botnet Recruitment as a PSG
PSG can be used to model the recruitment of new bots into the botnet, which takes place in Steps 3 and 4.
Consider the interaction between a single infected device and a set of an unknown number of new target devices
with heterogeneous abilities to differentiate between legitimate login attempts and malicious login attempts. The
infected device is the sender S. The number of target devices (receivers R) is Poisson distributed with parameter
λ.
For S, let x = l denote legitimate attempts to access a target device, and x = d denote attacker attempts to access
a target device. For R, weak receivers (type y = k) have default password settings. Strong receivers (type y = o)
have strong password settings. Active receivers (type y = v) have strong password settings and can be motivated
to use active defense (Step 6) after a series of failed login attempts.
Next, for messages, let m = p denote the choice of both types of S to attempt access, and let m = w denote the
choice to drop out. For actions, let a = t, g, and f denote the options that each receiver can choose to take when
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S participates. Action t denotes allowing access, g denotes denying access, and f denotes using active defense.
Active defense could include reporting the offending device to an ISP (Step 7a), or recording the attacker behavior
for research purposes (Step 7b). In addition, active defense could include attempting to shutdown the offending
device. Invincea Labs recently presented a method by which a target of Mirai could cause a buffer overflow in the
device attacking it [31].
D. Mechanisms to Shift the Equilibria of the PSG
Based on Fig. 5, we can design mechanisms to move undesirable equilibria to desirable equilibria. For instance,
consider starting from the equilibrium of Theorem 4: a scenario in which all devices trust deceptive senders, and
deceptive senders fully participate. Consider trying to move this to the equilibrium of Theorem 9, in which active
receivers use active defense, and this is enough to deter deceptive senders from participating fully.
On the right pair of axis, we need to move from the right-half plane to the left-half plane. To do this, we need
to decrease T DRv (URv , δRv ) − qS(d). We can do this be increasing the incentive for active defense (URv (d, p, f))
or improving the detector δv. Next, we need to move from the top half-plane to the bottom half-plane on both
figures. This requires decreasing BPSd (ωd, qR, δ). We can increase the impact ωfd of active defense, decrease the
benefit ωtd of successfully recruiting a new bot, increase the proportion q
R(v) of active receivers, or improve the
detector10 δv. Together, these steps put the game in the regimes denoted by the equilibrium of Theorem 9. Clearly,
applying PSG to mitigate deception in the IoT requires building upon these foundations; mechanisms for improving
the equilibria of PSG can be more thoroughly investigated, and the values of utility functions can be determined
through empirical work. Our work provides a foundation for these future directions.
VII. DISCUSSION
PSG build upon previous models of deception in several important ways. Compared to traditional signaling games,
PSG capture situations with multiple receivers. They also account for the abilities of receivers to detect deception
with some probabilities. Finally, PSG allow deception detection ability to vary among receivers. When applied to
botnet recruitment, our model improves upon previous game-theoretic models by considering both malicious and
legitimate attempts to access devices.
Our framework also captures interdependent security, because the rate at which weak devices are deceived depends
upon whether devices capable of detecting deception choose to ignore and/or use active defense. In equilibrium, the
prevalence of deception depends on the incentives of the phisherman, the damages that phishing causes to its targets,
the incentives for active devices to implement crowd defense, and the abilities of the devices to detect deception.
We have applied PSG to capture the phenomenon of phishing for phools both in the IoT, but our model could
also apply to deception online or in interpersonal interactions. Lastly, PSG are not limited to modeling deception.
They can be used to study any situation in which a single sender broadcasts information to a pool of an unknown
number of receivers, and the receivers observe heterogeneous signals about the relationship between the sender’s
type and the message that he transmits.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF ACTION COUNT PROBABILITY P{c |σR, x,m}
This derivation uses the aggregation property and the decomposition property of the Poisson distribution. The
aggregation property states that if random variables γi ∼ Poisson(λi), i ∈ 1, . . . , N are independent, then their sum
Γ is also Poisson-distributed (c.f. [16]). That is,
Γ ,
(
n∑
i=1
γi
)
∼ Poiss
(
n∑
i=1
λi
)
. (69)
The decomposition property states that the converse property is true. If the sum of two independent r.v. is
Poisson-distributed, then each of the independent r.v. is Poisson distributed as well [28]. In other words, consider
a population whose size is drawn from a Poisson r.v. with parameter λ. Independently assign each member of the
10Interestingly, improving δv moves the game along both axes.
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population some characteristic φ ∈ Φ, with splitting probability Pφ. Then the total number of members of the
population with each characteristic φ ∈ Φ is Poisson distributed with parameter λPφ.
To apply this to PSG, note that the probability with which a single receiver plays an action a, given message m
and sender type x, is given by ∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x,m)σRy (a |m, e) . (70)
This is the splitting probability Pφ. Therefore, the r.v. which represents the number of receivers who play some
action a ∈ A is Poisson-distributed with mean
λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x,m)σRy (a |m, e) . (71)
Now, the r.v. for the counts of each action a ∈ A are all independent [22]. Therefore, Eq. (23) states the probability
with which the number of receivers who play t, g, and f is given by c = [ ct cg cf ]T . The probabilities with
which the action counts are equal to ct, cg, and cf are multiplied, due to their independence.
APPENDIX B
SIMPLIFICATION OF SENDER EXPECTED UTILITY U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R)
Each each component of c is distributed according to a Poisson r.v.. The components are independent, so that
P
{
c |σR, x,m} = ∏
a∈A
P
{
ca |σR, x,m
}
. (72)
Recall that S receives zero utility when he plays m = w. Eliminating the cases in which S plays w from Eq. (22),
and substituting from Eq. (72) and Eq. (29), we have
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = σSx (p)
∑
c∈Z(A)
∏
a∈A
P
{
ca |σR, x, p
}(
ωtxct + ω
g
xcg + ω
f
xcf
)
. (73)
Next, expand the first summation:
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = σSx (p)
∑
ct∈Z
∑
cg∈Z
∑
cf∈Z
∏
a∈A
P
{
ca |σR, x, p
}(
ωtxct + ω
g
xcg + ω
f
xcf
)
. (74)
Then distribute all of the first terms over ωtxct + ω
g
xcg + ω
f
xcf :
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = σSx (p)ω
t
x
∑
ct∈Z
∑
cg∈Z
∑
cf∈Z
∏
a∈A
P
{
ca |σR, x, p
}
ct
+ σSx (p)ω
g
x
∑
ct∈Z
∑
cg∈Z
∑
cf∈Z
∏
a∈A
P
{
ca |σR, x, p
}
cg
+ σSx (p)ω
f
x
∑
ct∈Z
∑
cg∈Z
∑
cf∈Z
∏
a∈A
P
{
ca |σR, x, p
}
cf . (75)
Now some of the probability terms can be pulled out of the summations. In the first line, for instance, P{cg |σR, x, p}
and P{cf |σR, x, p} are not functions of ct, so they can be removed from the summation over ct ∈ Z. Doing this
for each line yields
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = σSx (p)ω
t
x
∑
cg∈Z
P
{
cg |σR, x, p
} ∑
cf∈Z
P
{
cf |σR, x, p
}∑
ct∈Z
P
{
ct |σR, x, p
}
ct
+ σSx (p)ω
g
x
∑
cf∈Z
P
{
cf |σR, x, p
}∑
ct∈Z
P
{
ct |σR, x, p
}∑
cg∈Z
P
{
cg |σR, x, p
}
cg
+ σSx (p)ω
f
x
∑
ct∈Z
P
{
ct |σR, x, p
}∑
cg∈Z
P
{
cg |σR, x, p
} ∑
cf∈Z
P
{
cf |σR, x, p
}
cf . (76)
The rightmost summation in the first line is an expected value, because it sums the value ct multiplied by its
pmf at each integer in the r.v’s support. What is the expected value of ct? Recall that the expected value is simply
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the λ parameter from the Poisson game, multiplied by the proportion of receivers who can be expected to play t.
From the exponent of Eq. (23), this product is λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (t | p, e) . Substituting the expected
values for ct, cg, and cf into Eq. (76), we have
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = σSx (p)ω
t
x
∑
cg∈Z
P
{
cg |σR, x, p
} ∑
cf∈Z
P
{
cf |σR, x, p
}
λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (t | p, e)
+ σSx (p)ω
g
x
∑
cf∈Z
P
{
cf |σR, x, p
}∑
ct∈Z
P
{
ct |σR, x, p
}
λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (g | p, e)
+ σSx (p)ω
f
x
∑
ct∈Z
P
{
ct |σR, x, p
}∑
cg∈Z
P
{
cg |σR, x, p
}
λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (f | p, e) . (77)
But the other summations in each line simply sum a pmf over its entire support. They are equal to one. This gives
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = σSx (p)ω
t
xλ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (t | p, e)
+ σSx (p)ω
g
xλ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (g | p, e)
+ σSx (p)ω
f
xλ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (f | p, e) , (78)
or, in condensed form,
U¯Sx (σ
S
x , σ
R) = λσSx (p)
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
qR (y) δy (e |x, p)σRy (a | p, e)ωax. (79)
APPENDIX C
SELF-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
We will show that, under Eq. (36) and Eq. (37),
σS∗l (p) = 1 =⇒ σR∗k (t | p, n) = σR∗k (t | p, b) = 1, σR∗o (t | p, n) = 1, σR∗v (t | p, n) = 1. (80)
We will also show the converse: that under Eq. (36) and Eq. (37),
σR∗k (t | p, n) = σR∗k (t | p, b) = 1, σR∗o (t | p, n) = 1, σR∗v (t | p, n) = 1 =⇒ σS∗l (p) = 1. (81)
First, assume that σS∗l (p) = 1. If σ
S∗
d (p) = 1 as well, then the senders are pooling on participation. Then
∀e ∈ E, µRk (d | p, e) = qR(d), i.e., weak receivers simply use the prior probability as their belief. If σS∗d (p) < 1,
then ∀e ∈ E, µRk (d | p, e) < qR(d). But the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of Eq. (37) implies that in
both of these situations, σR∗k (t | p, e) = 1. (This is found by showing that the expected utility of R of type k for
playing t is greater than those for playing g or f.) Further, the other terms on the RHS of Eq. (37) imply that
σR∗o (t | p, n) = 1 and σR∗v (t | p, n) = 1. We have proved the first direction.
In the second direction, assume that σR∗k (t | p, n) = σR∗k (t | p, b) = σR∗o (t | p, n) = σR∗v (t | p, n) = 1. Then the
worst situation for S of type l is that σRo (g | p, b) = σRv (f |p, b) = 1. But Eq. (36) implies that the sender’s expected
utility for participation is still greater than zero, which he would get if he withdrew. Therefore, σS∗l (p) = 1 is
implied. We have proved the second direction.
APPENDIX D
PHISHERMEN ARE UNOPPOSED AND PARTICIPATE FULLY
The beliefs come directly from Eq. (28). The expected utility of R of type o is higher for playing trust than for
playing ignore if
µRo (d | p, b) ≤
URo (l, p, t)
URo (l, p, t)− URo (d, p, t)
. (82)
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But this is implied by the combination of Eq. (39) and Eq. (41). Therefore, σR∗o (t | p, b) = 1. Similarly, the expected
utility of R of type v is higher for playing trust than for using active defense if
µRv (d | p, b) ≤
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p)
(URv (l, p, t)− URv (l, p, f)) δv (b | l, p) + (URv (d, p, f)− URv (d, p, t)) δv (b | d, p)
. (83)
But this is implied by the combination of Eq. (39) and Eq. (42). Therefore, σR∗v (t | p, b) = 1. Given these two
equilibrium strategies, S of type d is always trusted, which gives him positive utility. Therefore, σS∗d (p) = 1.
APPENDIX E
PHISHERMEN ARE IGNORED AND PARTICIPATE FULLY
Again, the beliefs come directly from Eq. (28). Now Eq. (43) and Eq. (46) imply
µRo (d | p, b) ≥
URo (l, p, t)
URo (l, p, t)− URo (d, p, t)
, (84)
so σR∗o (g | p, b) = 1. But Eq. (43) and Eq. (47) imply that Eq. (83) still holds, so σR∗v (t | p, b) = 1. Now the expected
utility of S of type d for participating is positive, because of Eq. (44). Therefore, σS∗d (p) = 1.
APPENDIX F
PHISHERMEN ARE FOUGHT AND PARTICIPATE FULLY
This proof is similar to that of Theorem 5, except that the order of Eq. (43) is reversed.
APPENDIX G
PHISHERMEN ARE IGNORED AND FOUGHT AND PARTICIPATE FULLY
This proof is similar to that of Theorem 5, except that ratio terms of Eq. (43) are both greater than qS(d).
APPENDIX H
PHISHERMEN ARE IGNORED AND SOMETIMES WITHDRAW
This is a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium is found when each player uses the mixed-strategy that
makes the other player indifferent. Strategy σR∗o (g | p, b) which satisfies Eq. (58) makes deceptive senders exactly
indifferent between playing participate and playing withdraw. Thus, they can play the mixed-strategy in Eq. (60)
which makes strong receivers exactly indifferent between playing ignore and playing trust. This allows the strong
receivers to play a mixed-strategy. Meanwhile, Eq. (43) implies that active receivers always play trust.
APPENDIX I
PHISHERMEN ARE FOUGHT AND SOMETIMES WITHDRAW
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.
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